|
|
|
| Limited Control Standard: A Necessary but not Sufficient Element in Evaluating the Copyrightability of AIGC |
| DONG Huijuan,YU Fei |
| Intellectual Property Research Institute, Xiamen University, 361005, Xiamen, China |
|
|
|
|
Abstract In copyright law, the human control standard represents typically an important yet implicit element. In the context of AI technology, this control requirement has emerged as a “drawn sword”, serving as a fundamental premise in the examination and determination of the copyrightability of AI-generated content (AIGC), and playing a significant role, as evidenced by recent judicial cases in China. In scenarios involving random factors in creation, including AI-assisted creation, the control requirement assumes heightened importance. It is necessary to analyze the extent and effects of random intervention on the assessment of human control, and in combination with the specific context of AI random intervention in creative processes, to further analyze its impact on the determination of control. “Limited Control” Standard should be established as a necessary requirement for judicial practice. The examination of this requirement encompasses the possibility of human’s intellectual input, elements of original human expression, embodiment of creator's personal will, and related factors. Accordingly, “Limited control” standard necessitates the human intellectual input to lead to the crucial expression in AIGC, and such expression can be perceived. Based on the justification of the limited control standard, this paper analyzes its key aspects, including: the size of the creative space constrained by AI technology framework, whether human intellectual input can and whether it leads to the formation of key expressions in AIGC, and whether such key expressions can be perceived or recognized by humans. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the application of “limited control” standard across specific scenarios: ① In cases of weak control, AIGC is likely to be protected by copyright law, despite varying levels of control strength, with protection typically limited to elements reflecting human contribution, resulting in two outcomes: first, weak control in human-machine symbiosis can demonstrate weak human control capability at any link, such as input end, process end, or output end of AI generation, thus meeting the requirement of human control; second, under weak control, the generation process of AIGC fails to reflect human intellectual input, making it difficult or impossible to prove that the human control has been implemented; ② In the absence of control, it is difficult to grantcopyright, but under specific conditions,alternative protection paths, such as the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, may be sought; ③ In strong control scenarios, AIGC likely qualifies for copyright protection. Under strong control, human authors either guide the AI generation process or merely use the AIgenerated products as constituent elements during their creation. Having the author lead and control the formation of key expression elements in the work can meet the requirement for controlling elements.
|
|
Published: 09 September 2025
|
|
|
|
| 案件序号 | 案件名称 | 判决结果 | 核心观点 | | 1 | 2005年,河南商丘石碑案④ | 法院认为石碑是偶然发现的自然现象,并不能单独作为著作法意义上的创作作品认定 | 石碑是夜间来往车辆灯光照射所偶然呈现的自然现象,并不是人类有意识的独立构思与创作的产物 | | 2 | 2011,Kelly v. Chicago Park District(美国)⑤ | 法院认为Wildflower Works因缺乏作者身份和固定性,不能成为作品,不能获得版权保护 | 尽管Wildflower Works包含人工设计(如花卉品种选择、几何图案布局),但其生长过程依赖自然力(季节、气候、植物自然特性等),艺术家无法对作品最终形态实施持续性、主导性控制 | | 3 | 2023, Zarya of the Dawn.(美国)⑥ | AI用户无法成为生成图像的作者,生成图像也无法获得版权保护 | 版权局认为,Midjourney软件无法被人类用户所控制,是以不可预测的方式生成图像 |
|
|
|
| 案件序号 | 案件名称 | 判决结果 | 核心观点 | | 4 | 1999,Lindsay v. R.M.S. Titani ①(美国) | 法院认为海底拍摄的照片,未亲自潜入海底进行实地拍摄的人拥有作者身份 | 原告通过在拍摄前对使用灯光的类型和数量、采用的特定摄影机角度以及其他细节的掌握,显示了其对拍摄过程和作品表达的“高度控制” | | 5 | 2017年北京气球拍摄案② | 法院认为在气球上自动拍摄的图片符合独创性要求,构成摄影作品 | 虽然涉案视频的拍摄为自动拍摄,但在拍摄的过程中仍然体现了人工干预和选择,包括拍摄目的、拍摄手法、拍摄器材选择、拍摄角度构建等 | | 6 | 2025年武汉“某AI”APP案③ | 原告能够成为被诉图片的作者及著作权人,被诉图片也凝结了原告的智力劳动成果,应当保护 | 该判决强调原告对生成作品具有一定程度的“控制和预见”,创作过程反映了原告的构思、创作技法、审美选择,体现了原告的个性化表达 |
|
|
|
| 1 |
易继明. 人工智能创作物是作品吗?[J]. 法律科学(西北政法大学学报), 2017 (5): 137- 147.
|
| 2 |
孙山. 人工智能生成内容的著作权法规制:基于对核心概念分析的证成[J]. 浙江学刊, 2018 (2): 113- 120.
|
| 3 |
李伟民. 人工智能智力成果在著作权法中的正确定性:与王迁教授商榷[J]. 东方法学, 2018 (3): 149- 160.
|
| 4 |
杨利华. 人工智能生成物著作权问题探究[J]. 现代法学, 2021 (4): 102- 114.
|
| 5 |
丁晓东. 著作权的解构与重构:人工智能作品法律保护的法理反思[J]. 法制与社会发展, 2023 (5): 109- 127.
|
| 6 |
王迁. 论人工智能生成的内容在著作权法中的定性[J]. 法律科学(西北政法大学学报), 2017 (5): 148- 155.
|
| 7 |
李琛. 论人工智能的法学分析方法:以著作权为例[J]. 知识产权, 2019 (7): 14- 22.
|
| 8 |
刘银良. 论人工智能作品的著作权法地位[J]. 政治与法律, 2020 (3): 2- 13.
|
| 9 |
张新宝, 卞龙. 人工智能生成内容的著作权保护研究[J]. 比较法研究, 2024 (2): 77- 91.
|
| 10 |
GINSBURG J C , BUDIARDJO L A . Authors and machines[J]. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2019, 34 (2): 343.
|
| 11 |
BURJ D L . Thirty-Six views of copyright authorship,by Jackson Pollock[J]. Houston Law Review, 2020, 58 (2): 270.
|
| 12 |
BALGANSH S . Causing copyright[J]. columbia Law Review, 2017, 117 (1): 67.
|
| 13 |
吕炳斌. 面向人工智能时代的著作权法拟制作者理论重构[J]. 南京社会科学, 2023 (10): 90- 103.
|
| 14 |
吴汉东. 论人工智能生成内容的可版权性:实务、法理与制度[J]. 中国法律评论, 2024 (3): 113- 129.
|
| 15 |
李杨, 涂藤. 论人工智能生成内容的可版权性标准[J]. 知识产权, 2024 (1): 68- 84.
|
| 16 |
毕文轩. 生成式人工智能生成内容的版权属性与保护路径[J]. 比较法研究, 2024 (3): 55- 71.
|
| 17 |
徐小奔. 论人工智能生成内容的著作权法平等保护[J]. 中国法学, 2024 (1): 166- 185.
|
| 18 |
王迁. 再论人工智能生成的内容在著作权法中的定性[J]. 政法论坛, 2023, 41 (4): 16- 33.
|
| 19 |
蒋舸. 论人工智能生成内容的可版权性:以用户的独创性表达为视角[J]. 知识产权, 2024 (1): 36- 67.
|
| 20 |
崔国斌. 人工智能生成物中用户的独创性贡献[J]. 中国出版, 2023 (6): 15- 23.
|
| 21 |
张玲. AIGC作品定性之辩驳性分析[J]. 南开学报(哲学社会科学版), 2025 (2): 81- 95.
|
| 22 |
M. 雷炳德. 著作权法[M]. 张恩民, 译. 北京: 法律出版社2004: 39.
|
| 23 |
ROUCK F D . Moral rights & AI environments: the unique bond between intelligent agents and their creations[J]. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2019, 114 (4): 300.
|
| 24 |
曾白凌. 目的之“人”:论人工智能创作物的弱保护[J]. 现代出版, 2020 (4): 56- 64.
|
| 25 |
李俊. 论人工智能生成内容的著作权法保护[J]. 甘肃政法学院学报, 2019 (4): 77- 85.
|
| 26 |
龙文懋, 季善豪. 作品创造性本质以及人工智能生成物的创造性问题研究[J]. 电子知识产权, 2019 (5): 4- 15.
|
| 27 |
王渊, 王翔. 论人工智能生成内容的版权法律问题[J]. 当代传播, 2018 (4): 84- 87.
|
| 28 |
丁文杰. 通用人工智能视野下著作权法的逻辑回归:从“工具论”到“贡献论”[J]. 东方法学, 2023 (5): 94- 105.
|
| 29 |
王国柱. 人工智能生成物可版权性判定中的人本逻辑[J]. 华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2023, 55 (1): 133-142,205.
|
| 30 |
罗伯特·P. 莫杰思. 知识产权正当性解释[M]. 金海军, 史兆欢, 寇海侠, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 2019: 158.
|
| 31 |
袁锋. 论新技术环境下作品独创性的判断:以“选择空间法”为视角[J]. 华中科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2020, 34 (5): 94- 102.
|
| 32 |
Luko?evi?ien? A . On author,copyright and originality: does the unified EU originality standard correspond to the digital reality in Wikipedia?[J]. Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, 2017, 11 (2): 221.
|
| 33 |
朱阁. “AI文生图”的法律属性与权利归属研究[J]. 知识产权, 2024 (1): 24- 35.
|
| 34 |
王利明. 人工智能时代提出的法学新课题[J]. 中国法律评论, 2018 (2): 1- 4.
|
| 35 |
丛立先, 李泳霖. 生成式AI的作品认定与版权归属:以ChatGPT的作品应用场景为例[J]. 山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2023 (4): 171- 181.
|
| 36 |
李扬, 李晓宇. 康德哲学视点下人工智能生成物的著作权问题探讨[J]. 法学杂志, 2018, 39 (9): 43- 54.
|
| 37 |
丛立先. 人工智能生成内容的可版权性与版权归属[J]. 中国出版, 2019 (1): 11- 14.
|
| 38 |
孔祥俊. 反不正当竞争法补充保护知识产权的有限性[J]. 中国法律评论, 2023 (3): 19- 32.
|
| 39 |
夏毓镁. 人工智能生成物保护路径比较研究[J]. 北方法学, 2025, 19 (1): 67- 82.
|
| 40 |
章凯业. 机器中的作者与创作:从摄影技术到生成式人工智能[J]. 中外法学, 2024, 36 (6): 1564- 1583.
|
| [1] |
LUO Qiyuan,JIAO Lin. Exploring Collaborative Models and Innovation Strategies for Libraries and Publishers in the Era of Digital Intelligence[J]. Science-Technology & Publication, 2025, 44(6): 44-51. |
| [2] |
GUAN Xin,DING Yiling,LIN Lin,ZHANG Shiyue,CHEN Sihan,LI Xinwei,HAN Hongzhi,LI Xinxin,XING Xiangyu,ZHANG Haiyang. Editing and Processing of Chinese Abstract in Medical Journals Empowered by DeepSeek Technology[J]. Science-Technology & Publication, 2025, 44(6): 95-102. |
|
|
|
|